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I am very excited about my book being discussed in the Völkerrechtsblog and
grateful to Michael Bader for organising it, and for the six readers taking their
time to dip into my 500-page tome. I hope I can do some justice to the reviews in
these few words, and for the questions or comments not addressed, I hope the
opportunity arises for a face to face discussion, over a beer perhaps. It has been
really wonderful to reconnect with a dear old friend – Hannah and I practically wrote
our PhDs together in London – enjoying intense discussions over wine, tea and
jigsaw puzzles. It’s good to see an old co-worker, Miriam, and a more recent friend
and collaborator on the Role of Law in Global Value Chains interdisciplinary research
project, Klaas Eller, as well as three scholars I have yet to get to know.
I consider myself fortunate to be able to engage with a German(-speaking)
readership. Having worked in the UK for the past 20+ years, my intellectual
framework and context is largely Anglo-Saxon – meaning we read in English, the
texts of the former British Empire – and sooner British, Canadian, or Indian than
German, French or Spanish. However being Dutch – and having spent time living
and working in the Middle East, Berlin (I wrote the Nuremberg and Tokyo Chapters
while at the Humboldt as the guest of Prof Dr Florian Jessberger), Geneva and most
recently in Paris, I’m comfortable moving into different intellectual frameworks – even
if never as a native speaker. What fascinates me is how the “English”, “French”,
“German” (and not to mention those I don’t have access to in other languages),
intellectual frameworks engage similar questions but develop unique literatures,
narratives and concepts in a way that isn’t always easy to bridge. Certain key
concepts or debates in one framework are largely unknown in another, and certain
key authors in one, don’t necessarily ‘translate’ into another – not because of quality
but simply because there aren’t the same points of reference for them to ‘stick’ to.
It is clear to me that my work is going to be received differently in Germany because
of the key debates put forward by scholars such as Sonja Buckel, Andreas Fischer-
Lescano and Christoph Menke. As a Marxist of course I am also interested in the
way different historical-materialist contexts give rise to different perspectives, added
to the – dare I say – ‘relatively autonomous’ intellectual frameworks, and the effects
this has on the work we produce, the questions we ask and the futures we can
imagine. In my book, I give attention to the development of intellectual frameworks,
such as the current framework within which the corporation is understood, how
international law and especially international criminal law is understood in given
times and places, and in particular how come we have a narrow, mainly law-focused
perspective on the solution to the problems of corporate capitalism, and of course,
how we once again broaden our vision so as to be able to imagine a radically
different future.
In this short reply I will say a few words about the birth of the corporation,
modern law in the transition to capitalism, the commodity form theory of law (also
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relevant to Horst’s critique), and then I will discuss Hannah’s specific comment on
Weltanschauung in Nuremberg / Washington before engaging with Miriam’s and
Horst’s perspectives on law’s utility in the struggle for a better world.
The commodity form theory of law
Corporations exist in a very similar form, with the same building blocks of separate
legal personality, perpetual life, limited liability of shareholders and a profit mandate-
around the world. Despite local variations, for instance in governance, taking as
an example the German workers’ councils, those vital building blocks are now
universal. Most company law textbooks don’t tell us where the corporation came
from, accepting it as an inevitable part of our world. In the early part of the book
I describe how the corporate legal form was created as a vehicle to finance the
risky overseas ‘explorations’ of companies like the Dutch and British East India
Companies – which ‘crowdfunded’ their potentially extremely lucrative voyages –
if the ships came back laden with looted gold, spices and enslaved people – but
where investors would never lose more than what they had put in (the origin of
limited liability shareholding). The Dutch East India Company founded the world’s
first stock exchange, originally part of the company itself, allowing the free trade
in shares, which became popular especially with the issue of penny shares, which
allowed anybody to, literally, ‘buy into’ capitalism. The corporate form has been
from its inception an instrument of imperialism, colonial administration, the cross-
Atlantic trade in enslaved people – the export of capitalist law all around the globe
and the drawing of colonial borders in the corporate scramble for Africa. After the
Berlin Conference of 1884-5, two thirds of the globe were colonised and ruled by
companies.
On the domestic level, the corporate enterprise as the forerunner of the
‘universalised’ form, first emerged in England. This was after the enclosures driving
thousands of English commoners off their land and the creation of a mass landless
class to be put to work in the factories that produced cloth out of the cotton grown
by the enslaved people of the Caribbean. The Industrial revolution was fuelled
by the wealth extracted from the bodies of enslaved people. When production of
everyday items expanded beyond the household, law transformed kinship relations
into legal relations, where contract replaced trust, and ‘calculable law’ enabled the
externalisation or the exchange of risk – allowing for literal accountability. Double
entry bookkeeping was introduced at the same time as the cash nexus came into
every relationship and people became legal subjects. The universalized ‘legal
system’ at the time of the transition to capitalism was built upon the primary norm
of private property ownership, and the protection of what is “mine not yours”. This
protection takes the form of a threat of violence (physical or structural/economic)
which is inherent in the legal form itself.
Pashukanis understood law (the legal form generalised in legal systems) to emerge
in the transition to capitalism, when the modern state form emerged. Of course,
there were instances, regimes and practices of law before then, such as Roman
law, ecclesiastical law, Islamic law, Chinese law, but what Pashukanis understands
as law properly so-called is the law that facilitates, permits, protects the property
relation and property exchange; this law enabled the move from a feudal to a market
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society in the transition to capitalism in 18th C Europe. Although law inhered at times
between individuals prior to this (e.g. Marx describes the Roman manifestation of
“attributes of the juridical person, precisely of the individual engaged in exchange”
in Chapter 5 of the Grundrisse) law becomes generalised and universalised through
European imperialism. The capitalism of law inheres in law’s form – the lawness
of law, as China Miéville puts it – that element that sets legal relations apart from
‘mere’ power relations or custom. This is the element that allows property owners
to recognise each other as legal equals bargaining on the market, and eventually to
exchange a commodity. Pashukanis writes, “[t]he juridical element in the regulation
of human conduct enters where the isolation and opposition of interests begins.” To
this we can add Marx, who explains that “it is the economic relation that determines
the subject matter comprised in each [..] juridical act.” Law is the abstracted form of
the specific social relations and legal systems operate along the logic of capitalism.
It is the capitalist logic of law, the logic of the commodity form, that enables the
actionable calculation of the cash nexus in all legal relationships. In the book, I
focus on the commodification of the responsibility relationship: transforming the
responsibility relationship into one of calculable risk, which thus becomes available
for exchange.
Nuremberger messiness
The leap from the origins of the commodity form theory of law in the transition to
capitalism and the Nuremburg trials of the industrialist may appear to be a big
one. However, these trials present an early example of the commodification of
criminal responsibility in a business context. Hannah Franzki in her work examines
those same trials as well as the trials which sought and, in some cases, are still
seeking to address the economic dimensions of the last Argentinian dictatorship
(1976-1983). In it Hannah shows international criminal law to be liberal partly
because “it understands the economic dimensions of state crime according to the
ontological separation of the state and the economic which is inherited from political
liberalism.” Franzki found that the judges in the Nuremberg trials of the industrialists
convicted the defendants on the basis of their violating this ontological principle of
political liberalism – which was so deeply entrenched in the minds of liberal lawyers
that it acquired a normative function.
I see the industrialist trials as far messier. There was a paradigm shift in US foreign
policy with the death of Roosevelt in the Spring of 1945 and the fall from grace of
Morgenthau, the main architect of post-WWII US foreign policy, and the looming
war with Korea for which the US government now wished its industrialists to start
producing arms. I understand the public/private divide as an ideological (not
ontological) divide giving rise to separate spheres in international law (public
international law which includes the laws of war, international humanitarian and
human rights law which does not contain the corporate subject) and international
economic law (which includes international trade, investment and finance law –
where corporations do have legal personality, see Chapter 2 of the book). This divide
was not that clear cut in the domestic law of the 1940s (and all of the US lawyers
were domestically trained) at a time when businesses were still largely family owned
and deeply associated with their individual owners. The Farben prosecutor relates
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in his memoir how he was given the order from the War Department to not file
aggressive war charges against the industrialists, “as the DuPonts wouldn’t like
it” (Dubois 1952, p. 22). Only later, during the neoliberal era of financialisaton (as
I illustrate in Chapter 4) did the individual businessmen largely disappear from the
picture and currently we understand corporate accountability predominantly as legal
person liability.
The memoirs of the US lawyers involved on the prosecution side reveal a memo
coming down from Washington ordering a change of course for the trials in line
with the new foreign policy priorities in light of the Cold War. In a close reading
of the trial transcripts, the awkwardness and embarrassment of the lawyers and
judges contradicting their earlier findings is almost tangible. On their return to the
US, several of the prosecution lawyers were persecuted by McCarthy for alleged
communist sympathies, and some became prominent human rights activists and
lawyers. As individuals, we seek to create history within the given parameters of the
structures we inhabit, steered by prevailing ideologies to some extent or another,
in alignment with our class interest, in conflict with that of others. There is no doubt
some of the lawyers were influenced by Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (a copy was
given to all members of the main trial’s prosecution team), others will have acted
from a sense of noblesse oblige, and yet others may well have had communist
leanings. While writing these chapters, I was grateful for the US obsession with
preserving all public and private documentation, while at the same time realising the
ideological significance of this work.
In the end, the effect of the trials was as Franzki describes. It was the ideological
separation between capitalism and communism at the inception of the Cold War
which split the ‘economic’ off from the ‘humanitarian’ in international criminal law,
thereby not only influencing the trials in concretely identifiable ways, but also and
most importantly changing the way conflict would be understood: No longer a result
of imperialism and market expansionism, but rather a result of individual and/or
ethno-racial pathology. The liberal lawyers were disciplined, and ICL was recruited to
the ‘capitalising mission’ – which we can see play out in the later and contemporary
international criminal trials (my chapter 5).
The messy reality of wrangling over different interests is what interested me here. In
the book in general I pay attention also to agency as well as structure, with a view
to discovering the contradictions, where our most fertile opportunities to intervene
and fuel transformation lie (and, importantly, what the dead ends are). In the case
of the Nuremberg trials of the industrialists, the contradiction lies in the fact that
the first example of businessmen being tried for international crimes, ended up
both bolstering Western capitalism and giving rise to the illusion of the possibility of
corporate legal accountability.
If one holds that the capitalism of law lies only or primarily in its ability to be
instrumentalised by hegemonic powers then there is no specificity about the legal
relation or the legal form, no lawness of law as such. The way the commodity form
theory plays out in the ICL trials (aside from the prior fact that the businessmen
had acted in congruence with the ‘imperialism at the heart of the corporate form’,
see my Chapter 2), I explain in my Chapter 4. Pashukanis in his discussion of
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domestic criminal law states ‘law creates right by creating crime’. The value of
criminal law lies in its demonstrative function, its morality, and it functions as a ‘re-
moralisation’ of society post cash-nexus. Thus, commodified morality (a term I link
to Shamir) tells us when to feel revulsion, or when to forgive, who to grieve: it is
‘canned morality’, served up in the bourgeois theatre of international criminal trials.
Canned morality thus produces accountability in the Weberian sense – meaning that
through calculable law costs, benefits and risks of political actions can be calculated,
managed, and even optimised (p. 264).
Finally: what to do with(out) law
Contrary to popular understanding I am in agreement with Robert Knox (we wrote
our PhDs together, too) and do not hold an entirely nihilistic view with regard to
law. The argument is rather that we must look at it defensively and tactically, but
most importantly that we must look beyond it, as it alone or of itself is not going
to generate the social change we want and need. As Marx said in his Critique of
the Gotha Programme, “Right can never be higher than the economic structure
of society and the cultural development conditioned by it.” Direct action and mass
organising (however one understands that) is therefore needed to bring about real
change, either the societal change that allows for legal change (reform), or the
transformative change that breaks down the current structures and allows a new
world to be built in its place. With Marx, Pashukanis and other Marxists I believe that
in post-capitalist society both state and law will ‘wither away’. This result will not be
achieved by legal means, or through the courts.
As lawyers we tend to have an investment in law that is hard to relinquish. We
have studied hard to pass our exams, spent many years learning a special code,
language, skill that in England allows us to wear wigs and robes and speak Latin. As
lawyers we have status and gain respect from our families, society at large at least
traditionally speaking, and there is no worthier profession than being a human rights
lawyer. We get to be heroes speaking truth to power, standing up in lofty court rooms
representing the underdog. Law, and especially human rights is almost universally
accepted as a good thing.
In my Chapter 6 I respond to the concerns Miriam raises. I do not say that there
is no value at all in human rights litigation. I absolutely accept (and say so in
the book) that law, and the fulfilment of certain rights, is a life or death necessity
for some/many people. And still, human rights litigation is beset with all sorts of
problems, most significantly, the fact that human rights law limits what we can ask
for. Translating harm and violence into a claim actionable in a court by necessity
reduces, erases, individualises. It leaves alone the structure giving rise to the
problem. And eventually, it commodifies and allows for exchange. It is certainly the
case that mobilising around a human rights claim can be empowering, can lead
to an increased awareness and publicity around the issues faced by people at the
sharp end of corporate wrongdoing, and this is why such litigation must always be
accompanied by media work, and other forms of agitation. Rarely though do these
cases result in a concrete win, because the system (law) is not designed to grant
such a win. Human rights law legitimates the system which holds rights (such as
the economic social and cultural rights Miriam mentions) up to us as a carrot, or
- 5 -
as a dream, forever deferred. I am also not wholly anti-reformist: for example, I
am a union organiser in the University and College Union in the UK and daily fight
for the rights of increasingly precarious education workers. I am grateful to those
workers before me who ensured the 8-hour day through their collective direct action,
as Marx described in Capital. Legal and rights battles are won on the streets, in
busses, schools and factories; courts and legislators only follow when the battle
is already won (and, as most obviously in the case of the Factory Acts, in order to
save capitalism from itself). I too have been a human rights activist for many years.
Of course, we must also use law defensively, in defence of comrades arrested,
evicted, incarcerated, deported, persecuted, claiming asylum. At the same time,
our legal training and analytical skills allow us to do many other and arguably more
transformative things.
There is a lot we can do once we realise that neither cause lawyering nor academic
work is going to achieve the liberation we crave. We can engage in movement
building, build alternatives, alternative ways of producing, relating, resisting. We can
re-common private spaces and build dual power through mutual aid, commoning,
cooperatives. And some of this can even include legal work. For example, working
to support houseless people, tenants, migrants and asylum seekers with fulfilling
their immediate needs and protection from the violence of the system. You could
update the protest handbook. You could do arrestee support or represent activists in
court. You could build left infrastructure, you could update the squatters handbook,
build an abolitionist movement. You could be a photographer, journalist, independent
film maker, writer, you could practice alternative forms of living and decision making
and write about them so that others may learn from them, you could organise an
occupation, you could buy a boat and take it to the Mediterranean, you could occupy
a hotel and house refugees. Finally, there is still important archival and analytical
work to be done – in particular on racial capitalism, supporting the work done by
researchers such as Eddie Bruce-Jones and K-Sue Park for example.
I am sorry to hear that Marisa McVey finds my conclusions depressing. I would like
to invite Marisa, to experience the shedding of a false ideology as liberating! While I
do (with Horst) see a role for cooperatives and other more progressive organisational
forms in a transition to a post-capitalist world – and the legal registration of such
coops, contracts etc will probably remain essential while we still operate within a
capitalist world. Ultimately though, in a post-capitalist society, as an autonomist
Marxist I am committed to horizontal agreement and decision making and oppose
the notion of a rule enforceable by a hierarchically placed third party or institution.
I invite you also to imagine what a world would look like without state, and without
law. Could it build on the consensus decision making, mutual aid principles, activist
protocols, restorative and transformative justice programmes currently proliferating in
our pandemic world? This, to me, is where the excitement, and my next book project,
begins.
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